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OPINION OF THE COURT 
    
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
The Chapter 11 bankruptcy process gives a debtor many 
means to rehabilitate its business, including several to manage 
contractual obligations.  Chief amongst them is the flexibility 
to assume (i.e., continue) or reject (i.e., breach) executory 
contracts, which are contracts where the debtor and the 
nonbankrupt counterparty each has material obligations left to 
perform as of the bankruptcy filing.   
 
With great power comes great responsibility.  To 
assume an executory contract, a debtor must cure existing 
defaults and put the contract in the same place as if the 
bankruptcy never happened.  See 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A).  
This scheme interacts with the Bankruptcy Code’s sale 
provision, 11 U.S.C. § 363, which allows a purchaser to buy 
substantially all the debtor’s property “free and clear of any 
interest in such property.”  Id. § 363(f).  In practice, an 
executory contract can be “assumed” and then “assigned” to a 
buyer under § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code provided all 
existing defaults are cured.  A non-executory contract, on the 
other hand, can be sold under § 363 to a buyer, who must 
satisfy post-closing obligations but need not worry about pre-
closing breaches or defaults, which typically remain unsecured 
claims against the debtor’s estate.  Thus, whether a contract is 
classified as executory or non-executory has significant 




 This case is about whether a work-made-for-hire 
contract between a producer and a bankrupt movie company is 
an executory contract.  The Weinstein Company and its 
affiliates (“TWC” or the “Debtors”) filed bankruptcy petitions 
to facilitate the sale of substantially all their assets to Spyglass 
Media Group, LLC (a/k/a Lantern Entertainment LLC) under 
§ 363.  Spyglass wished to buy TWC’s contract with Bruce 
Cohen (the “Cohen Agreement”) for producing the critically 
acclaimed 2012 film Silver Linings Playbook.  At stake is 
whether Spyglass must cure existing defaults and pay around 
$400,000 owed to Cohen before the sale’s closing.  In re 
Weinstein Co. Holdings, LLC, No. 18-10601, 2020 WL 
1320821, at *5 (D. Del. Mar. 20, 2020).  As discussed below, 
because Cohen’s remaining obligations under the Cohen 
Agreement are not material and the parties did not clearly avoid 
New York’s substantial performance rule, we affirm the 
District Court’s affirmance of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision 
and hold the Cohen Agreement is not an executory contract.   
 
I. 
 In September 2011, Cohen and his production company 
entered into the Cohen Agreement with SLP Films, Inc., a non-
debtor special purpose entity formed by TWC to make Silver 
Linings Playbook (the “Picture”).  The parties structured the 
Cohen Agreement as a “work-made-for-hire” contract, 
meaning Cohen owned none of the intellectual property in the 
Picture.1  App. 2331, Cohen Agreement ¶ 9; see Cmty. for 
 
1 Producers can be thought of as project managers for a movie, 
overseeing various aspects of production such as developing a 
script, ensuring a film is delivered on time and within budget, 
and marketing the finished product.  
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Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 737 (1989) 
(explaining that the employer exclusively owns all the 
intellectual property in works made for hire).  In exchange, 
SLP Films agreed to pay Cohen $250,000 in fixed initial 
compensation, as well as contingent future compensation equal 
to roughly 5% of the Picture’s net profits.  App. 2328–29, 
Cohen Agreement ¶¶ 2–3.  The contingent compensation 
provision provides that  
 
[i]f the Picture is produced with [Cohen] as the producer 
thereof and [Cohen] fully perform[s] all required 
services and obligations hereunder and in relation to the 
Picture, and [is] not otherwise in breach or default 
hereof, [Cohen] shall be entitled to receive [Contingent 
Compensation]. 
 
App. 2329, Cohen Agreement ¶ 3.  The Picture was 
successfully released in November 2012 and resulted in an 
Academy Award for Best Actress for Jennifer Lawrence.  After 
some corporate maneuvers, TWC purports to own all the rights 
pertaining to the Picture, including the Cohen Agreement.2   
  
 
2 A complex web of agreements governed the relationship 
between TWC and the special purpose vehicles it created for 
the Picture.  App. 2028.  According to a former TWC 
executive, SLP Films transferred its rights in the Picture to 
SLPTWC Films, LLC, another special-purpose entity.  App. 
2092–93, 2194–95.  SLPTWC dissolved in October 2013 and 
SLP Films dissolved in April 2016.  App. 2195.  TWC, as the 
sole member of SLPTWC, believes it or its affiliates received 
all the rights in the Picture, including the Cohen Agreement.  
App. 2029, 2196.     
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 In 2017, TWC’s business cratered following a flood of 
credible sexual misconduct allegations against its co-founder, 
Harvey Weinstein.  Left with few options, TWC tried to sell its 
business and ultimately found Spyglass as the only interested 
buyer.  In March 2018, TWC filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
in the District of Delaware and asked the Bankruptcy Court to 
approve the sale to Spyglass under § 363 of the Bankruptcy 
Code.  The parties documented the sale’s terms in an Asset 
Purchase Agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”).   
 
The sale closed in July 2018, though the Purchase 
Agreement gave Spyglass until November 2018 to designate 
which of TWC’s executory contracts it wanted to assume as 
part of the sale.  App. 691, Purchase Agreement § 2.8(a) 
(defining “Assumed Contracts”); App. 694, 741.  However, 
Spyglass believed the Cohen Agreement was not executory at 
all.  In October 2018, it filed a declaratory judgment action 
against Cohen seeking a determination that the Cohen 
Agreement “is not executory and therefore was already [sold] 
to [Spyglass] pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 363.”  App. 
1152.  As noted above, if the Cohen Agreement is an executory 
contract and therefore assumed and assigned under § 365, 
Spyglass would be responsible for approximately $400,000 in 
previously unpaid contingent compensation.3  If Spyglass 
instead purchased the Cohen Agreement as a non-executory 
 
3 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) requires the debtor to cure or 
provide adequate assurance that it will cure all defaults under 
an assumed executory contract.  Here, that responsibility lies 
with Spyglass, who agreed to “pay all Cure Amounts required 
to assume the Assumed Contracts.”  App. 692, Purchase 
Agreement § 2.8(b).  
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contract under § 363, Spyglass would be responsible only for 
obligations on a go-forward basis after the sale closed.4  
 
The stakes became even higher.  In November 2018, 
writers, producers, and actors with similar works-made-for-
hire contracts (the “Talent Party Agreements”) hitched their 
wagon to the Cohen dispute and argued that their contracts are 
also executory, the implication being that Spyglass has to pay 
them millions of dollars in contingent compensation.  App. 
894; Cohen Br. at 6–7; Dist. Ct. Op. at 1, n.1 (“The parties 
stipulated to joint briefing of these appeals.”).   
 
In January 2019, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing 
on Spyglass’s motion for summary judgment in the Cohen 
dispute, recognizing that its ruling might serve as a bellwether 
for the Talent Party Agreements.  It issued a bench ruling 
granting Spyglass’s motion for summary judgment, 
concluding that the Cohen Agreement was not an executory 
contract and thus could be sold under § 363 to Spyglass.  App. 
2268, Bankr. Hr’g Tr. 135:16–25.5  Further, the Bankruptcy 
 
4 While Spyglass’s motivations for buying the Cohen 
Agreement are irrelevant for the legal question before us, we 
note for context that Spyglass claims it wanted to purchase the 
Cohen Agreement as “evidence of [the transfer of intellectual 
property] and the rights that came with it.”  Oral Arg. Tr. 29:6–
10.  We are skeptical this is the only reason, as Cohen cannot 
interfere with the Picture’s intellectual property even if TWC 
breaches the Cohen Agreement.  App. 2331, Cohen Agreement 
¶ 9.   
5 The Bankruptcy Court determined that, based on Spyglass’s 
actions, it could no longer deem the Cohen Agreement 
excluded from the sale.  If it is executory, then it was assumed 
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Court concluded that TWC owned the Cohen Agreement, and 
could sell it, after hearing testimony from TWC’s former 
Executive Vice President, Irwin Reiter, who testified about the 
chain-of-title for the Cohen Agreement.  Id. at 135:16–25, 
136:1–3.  The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s 
decision, and Cohen timely appealed to us.6   
 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(1) over the appeal from the final judgment of the 
Bankruptcy Court, which had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 157(b) and 1334.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291.   
 
 We stand in the shoes of the District Court and exercise 
plenary review of the Bankruptcy Court’s decision granting 
summary judgment in favor of Spyglass.  In re AE Liquidation, 
Inc., 866 F.3d 515, 522 (3d Cir. 2017).  We may affirm the 
grant of summary judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  We 
view all facts in the light most favorable to Cohen, who, as the 
non-moving party, is entitled to every reasonable inference that 
can be drawn from the record.  Id. at 522–23.  “We do not 
 
and then assigned to Spyglass.  If it is non-executory, then 
Spyglass purchased the rights under it under § 363.  App. 2173, 
Bankr. Hr’g Tr. 40:22–23 (“I think they lost the right to call 
them an excluded asset.”).  The parties do not dispute this 
ruling on appeal.   
6 The Producers Guild of America filed a short amicus brief 
in support of Cohen.   
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weigh the evidence; rather, we assess whether [it] is such that 
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving 
party.”  Id. at 523 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  In short, summary judgment in favor of Spyglass is 
appropriate if no reasonable jury could conclude the Cohen 
Agreement is an executory contract.   
 
III. 
 Section 365(a) of the Bankruptcy Code governs the 
treatment of executory contracts, but it does not define that 
term.  Rather it provides that “[e]xcept as provided in sections 
765 and 766 of this title [involving customer instructions and 
property not relevant here] and in subsections (b), (c), and (d) 
of this section, the trustee [or a debtor-in-possession, see 11 
U.S.C. § 1107(a)], subject to the court’s approval, may assume 
or reject any executory contract or unexpired lease of the 
debtor.”  11 U.S.C. § 365(a).  Without a definition of the word 
“executory,” the Supreme Court recognized that legislative 
history generally “indicates that Congress intended the term to 
mean a contract ‘on which performance is due to some extent 
on both sides.’”  NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 
522 n.6 (1984) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 347 (1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 
(1978)). 
 
 However, this reading “would cut too broadly,” as 
almost all contracts involve some unperformed obligations on 
both sides.  In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d 233, 238 (3d 
Cir. 1995).  Thus, our Circuit (and several others) adopted the 
following definition proposed by Professor Vern Countryman: 
“[An executory contract is] a contract under which the 
obligation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the 
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contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to 
complete performance would constitute a material breach 
excusing performance of the other.”  Vern Countryman, 
Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 
439, 460 (1973); see also In re Gen. DataComm Indus., Inc., 
407 F.3d 616, 623 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Countryman and 
citing to Sharon Steel Corp. v. Nat’l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 
872 F.2d 36, 39 (3d Cir. 1989)); 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 
365.02[2](a) n.10 (16th ed. 2020) (collecting cases).  “Thus, 
unless both parties have unperformed obligations that would 
constitute a material breach if not performed, the contract is not 
executory under § 365.”  Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 239.  “The 
time for testing whether there are material unperformed 
obligations on both sides is when the bankruptcy petition is 
filed.”  Id. at 240.  What constitutes a material unperformed 
obligation is governed by relevant state law.  See id. at 239 
n.10.  Putting all this together, the test for an executory contract 
is whether, under the relevant state law governing the contract, 
each side has at least one material unperformed obligation as 
of the bankruptcy petition date.   
 
 To facilitate the debtor’s rehabilitation, the Countryman 
test attempts to foolproof the debtor’s choice to assume or 
reject contracts; thus, the debtor only has that flexibility for 
executory contracts—those contracts where there could be 
uncertainty about whether they are valuable or burdensome.  A 
helpful perspective is to view executory contracts “as a 
combination of assets and liabilities to the bankruptcy estate; 
the performance the nonbankrupt owes the debtor constitutes 
an asset, and the performance the debtor owes the nonbankrupt 
is a liability.”  Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 238 (citing Thomas 
H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law 106–07 
(1986)).  Under this framework, a contract where the debtor 
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fully performed all material obligations, but the nonbankrupt 
counterparty has not, cannot be executory; that contract can be 
viewed as just an asset of the estate with no liability.  See 3 
Collier, supra ¶ 365.02[2](a).  Treating it as an executory 
contract risks inadvertent rejection because the debtor would 
in effect be giving up an asset by rejecting it.  Id.  On the other 
extreme, where the counterparty performed but the debtor has 
not, the contract is also not executory because it is only a 
liability for the estate.  Id.  Treating it as an executory contract 
risks inadvertent assumption, for the debtor would effectively 
be agreeing to pay the liability in full when the counterparty 
should instead pursue the claim against the estate like other 
(typically unsecured) creditors.  It logically follows that where 
“the only remaining obligation is the [debtor’s] duty to pay”—
the contract is not executory.  See In re Teligent, Inc., 268 B.R. 
723, 732 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); see also Lubrizol Enter., Inc. 
v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th 
Cir. 1985).  Thus, only where a contract has at least one 
material unperformed obligation on each side—that is, where 
there can be uncertainty if the contract is a net asset or liability 
for the debtor—do we invite the debtor’s business judgment on 
whether the contract should be assumed or rejected.  See 
Mission Prod. Holdings, Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC, 139 S. Ct. 
1652, 1658 (2019); In re Penn Traffic Co., 524 F.3d 373, 382 
(2d Cir. 2008).   
 
This context meshes with how a buyer can purchase the 
debtor’s contracts as part of a § 363 sale.  If the buyer wants to 
buy an executory contract, the debtor must assume and then 
assign that contract to the buyer.  In re CellNet Data Sys., Inc., 
327 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that typically “the 
debtor must first assume [a contract] in order to transfer it”) 
(citing In re Access Beyond Techs., Inc., 237 B.R. 32, 47 
13 
 
(Bankr. D. Del. 1999)).  To assume a contract, the debtor or the 
buyer must cure all existing defaults (or provide adequate 
assurance of a cure), basically putting the contract in the same 
place as if the bankruptcy did not happen.  See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(b); Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 238 (noting that, for an 
assumed executory contract, the Bankruptcy Code “mandates 
that the debtor accept the liability with the asset and fully 
perform his end of the bargain”).7  The requirement to cure 
existing defaults before assuming a contract is motivated by 
fairness to the nonbankrupt counterparty, as assuming the 
contract essentially provides a “means whereby a debtor can 
force others to continue to do business with it when the 
bankruptcy filing might otherwise make them reluctant to do 
so.”  Penn Traffic, 524 F.3d at 382 (internal citation omitted). 
   
However, if the contract is not executory, it can be sold 
to a § 363 buyer like any other liability or asset.  Cf. In re Am. 
Home Mortg. Holdings, Inc., 402 B.R. 87, 94 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2009) (explaining that § 363 “permits a debtor to transfer its 
rights and obligations under a non-executory contract”).  In the 
case of a non-executory contract where only the debtor has 
material obligations left to perform, the contract is a liability of 
the estate, and if the buyer wants to buy it, the buyer is 
voluntarily assuming that liability.8  Under the terms of the 
 
7 If the executory contract is rejected, that would “relegate the 
non-breaching party to an unsecured creditor.”  CellNet Data, 
327 F.3d at 249.  
8 One might wonder why a § 363 buyer would ever voluntarily 
assume liabilities.  Often the issue is negotiated between the 
debtor and the buyer.  The buyer can receive a discount on the 
purchase price for taking on the debtor’s liabilities.  The buyer 
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sale, the buyer must typically fulfill obligations under the 
contract it bought after the sale closes, just as it would with any 
other asset or liability.  But unless the parties agreed otherwise, 
no one is required to cure existing defaults, as the nonbankrupt 
counterparty is already in at least as good a position as without 
the sale.  See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (allowing the debtor, after 
notice and a hearing, to sell its property “free and clear of any 
interest in such property,” subject to certain conditions and 
applicable non-bankruptcy law); In re Trans World Airlines, 
Inc., 322 F.3d 283, 289 (3d Cir. 2003) (explaining that 
successor liability is often extinguished in a § 363 sale).  If no 
buyer came forward, the nonbankrupt counterparty would only 
have an unsecured claim against the debtor, on which it can 
typically expect to recover merely cents on the dollar.  Put 
differently, there are no fairness concerns, as the counterparty 
with nothing material left to do on the contract should simply 
be grateful that someone agreed to buy its contract and assume 
obligations after the sale’s closing.   
 
IV. 
This context sets the stage for the dispute before us.  Is 
the Cohen Agreement an executory contract?  If so, the 
contract was assumed and assigned to Spyglass, so it must cure 
existing defaults and pay approximately $400,000 in 
contingent compensation to Cohen.  If not, Spyglass only needs 
to comply with post-closing obligations coming due under the 
Cohen Agreement,  see Weinstein, 2020 WL 1320821, at *5 
(noting the Bankruptcy Court’s determination, not challenged 
by either party on appeal, that Spyglass is obligated to purchase 
 
may have additional considerations, such as wanting to start 
things on the right foot with vendors, suppliers, and the like.    
15 
 
the Cohen Agreement as either an executory or non-executory 
contract), and the $400,000 owed to Cohen pre-closing need 
not be paid, as it is simply an unsecured claim against the 
Debtors.   
 
 New York law governs the Cohen Agreement.  App. 
2336, Cohen Agreement ¶ 23.  Thus, we analyze whether the 
Agreement “contained at least one obligation for both [TWC] 
and [Cohen] that would constitute a material breach under New 
York law if not performed.”  In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957, 
962 (3d Cir. 2010).  In New York, “[a] material breach is a 
failure to do something that is so fundamental to a contract that 
the failure to perform that obligation defeats the essential 
purpose of the contract.”  Feldmann v. Scepter Grp., Pte. Ltd., 
185 A.D.3d 449, 450 (N.Y. App. Div. 2020) (quoting O & G 
Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 537 F.3d 153, 163 
(2d Cir. 2008)).   
 
New York also follows the substantial performance 
doctrine, meaning “[i]f the party in default has substantially 
performed, the other party’s performance is not excused.”  
Hadden v. Consol. Edison Co., 312 N.E.2d 445, 449 (N.Y. 
1974).  These are two sides of the same coin, as “[s]ubstantial 
performance and material breach are interrelated 
concepts[;] . . . if it is determined that a breach is material, or 
goes to the root or essence of the contract, it follows that 
substantial performance has not been rendered, and further 
performance by the other party is excused.”  In re Interstate 
Bakeries Corp., 751 F.3d 955, 962 (8th Cir. 2014) (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).   
 
 On TWC’s side, its obligation to pay contingent 
compensation to Cohen is clearly material.  Here, the amount 
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of contingent compensation far exceeded that of fixed 
compensation, reflecting the market reality that producers 
often try to work on films that will become hits so they can 
share in the profits.  See Awards.com, LLC v. Kinko’s, Inc., 42 
A.D.3d 178, 187 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007) (explaining that failure 
to pay the “primary consideration” under an agreement is a 
material breach).  Having concluded that TWC had at least one 
material obligation left to perform under the Cohen 
Agreement, we do not need to analyze whether other 
obligations, such as TWC’s obligation to give Cohen the right 
of first refusal to produce any sequels, are also material.  See 
App. 2332, Cohen Agreement ¶ 13.  
 
 Cohen’s remaining obligations, however, are a different 
story.  At a high level, the essence of the Cohen Agreement 
was for Cohen to produce the Picture in exchange for money.  
Thus, he contributed almost all his value when he produced the 
movie.  At the time of TWC’s bankruptcy, the Picture had been 
released for six years and Cohen had not done any further work 
on it.  Indeed, other courts agree that the employee in a work-
made-for-hire contract usually does not have material 
obligations after the work is completed despite ancillary 
negative covenants or indemnification obligations.  See In re 
Qintex Ent., Inc., 950 F.2d 1492, 1497 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding 
that contract between an actor and a production company was 
not executory after the movies were made because the actor 
“substantially completed [his] duties under the contracts”); In 
re Stein & Day Inc., 81 B.R. 263, 266 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) 
(holding that a publishing contract is not executory where the 
author wrote two books and assigned to the debtor-publisher 





A closer look at Cohen’s remaining obligations 
confirms our suspicion—they are all ancillary after-thoughts in 
a production agreement.  For instance, Cohen agreed to refrain 
from seeking injunctive relief about the exploitation of the 
Picture.  But that covenant is redundant, for Cohen has no 
claim to the Picture’s intellectual property rights and is already 
obligated to respect that property under relevant law.  App. 
2331, Cohen Agreement ¶¶ 9–10; Stein & Day, 81 B.R. at 266 
(explaining that the agreement not to violate intellectual 
property in a work is an independent obligation already 
“imposed by law”).  Also immaterial is Cohen’s obligation to 
indemnify TWC against third-party claims arising from the 
breach of his representations, warranties or covenants, as the 
statute of limitations has likely expired on most, if not all, of 
the potential claims.  App. 2333–34, Cohen Agreement ¶ 15; 
cf. Exide, 607 F.3d at 964 (explaining that expired indemnity 
obligation is not material).  Finally, the restrictions on Cohen’s 
ability to assign the contract are ancillary boilerplate 
provisions.  For instance, the Agreement requires Cohen to 
comply with a set of procedures to give TWC the right of first 
refusal if Cohen tries to sell or assign his right to receive 
contingent compensation.  App. 2350, Cohen Agreement 
Sch. 1 ¶ 3.5.  This obligation, however, is not a “significant 
undertaking,” as Cohen “has no obligation to [TWC] if he 
wants to accept more favorable terms from [others].”  Stein & 
Day, 81 B.R. at 267.  In short, none of Cohen’s remaining 
obligations go to the “root of the contract” or “defeat the 
purpose of the entire transaction” if breached.  Exide, 607 F.3d 








However, our analysis cannot end here.  Cohen argues 
that where parties already agreed an obligation is material, a 
court should not substitute its own judgment.  Here, the 
Agreement provided that TWC must pay contingent 
compensation provided Cohen is “not otherwise in breach or 
default.”  App. 2329, Cohen Agreement ¶ 3.  Based on this 
provision, he argues that all his obligations are material, as 
even a breach of a technical provision would excuse TWC’s 
obligation to pay contingent compensation. 
 
Cohen is correct that parties can contract around a 
default rule such as the substantial performance rule, that is, 
they can agree that what to the ordinary person is immaterial is 
nonetheless not so.  See Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889, 
891 (N.Y. 1921) (Cardozo, J.) (explaining that parties can 
avoid that rule by “apt and certain words”); see also Ian Ayres, 
Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 
121 Yale L.J. 2032, 2049 (2012) (describing the Jacob & 
Youngs decision as a “determination that the [parties’] actions 
were insufficient to contract around the substantial 
performance (default) rule”).  In General DataComm, we also 
acknowledged that where the contract makes plain that certain 
unperformed obligations are material, we can conclude the 
contract is executory without further analysis.  407 F.3d at 
623–24.  Put another way, a breach can be considered material 
if “upon a reasonable interpretation of the contract, the parties 
considered the breach as vital to the existence of the contract.”  





Although Cohen’s argument is forceful, we ultimately 
reject it because the parties did not clearly and unambiguously 
avoid the substantial performance rule for evaluating executory 
contracts.  For starters, the language Cohen relies on is a nine-
word phrase buried in a long covenant provision.9  By contrast, 
 
9 The full provision provides as follows (with the key language 
emphasized in italics).  App. 2329.  
 
3.  Contingent Compensation: If the Picture is 
produced with Artist [Bruce Cohen] as the 
producer thereof and Lender [Bruce Cohen 
Productions] and Artist fully perform all required 
services and obligations hereunder and in relation 
to the Picture, and are not otherwise in breach or 
default hereof, Artist shall be entitled to receive 
the following “Contingent Compensation”: 
 
(a) 5% of 100% of “Adjusted Gross Receipts” (if 
any) payable prospectively from and after “Cash 
Breakeven” (as both such terms are defined 
below) is reached, but calculated with an across-
the board 15% distribution fee. 
 
(b) “Adjusted Defined Receipts”, “Cash 
Breakeven” and “Contingent Proceeds” shall be 
defined, computed, paid and accounted for in 
accordance with the terms and conditions of 
Company’s Exhibit “DRCB” and Exhibit “CB”, 
as modified only by the Riders to such Exhibits, 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference 
(and in any event to be defined, computed, paid 
and accounted for no less favorably than Jon 
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the cases cited by Cohen where courts deferred to the parties’ 
agreement that all terms in the contract are material dealt with 
the remedies or termination section.  See Gen. DataComm, 407 
F.3d at 623–24 (providing any breach would cause termination 
of an employee’s benefits plan); In re Hawker Beechcraft, Inc., 
486 B.R. 264, 278 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013) (providing that 
buyer’s “breach of any term, even an immaterial term, would 
allow [seller] to terminate the [agreement] and sue for specific 
performance”); Avant Guard Props., LLC v. NYC Indus. Dev., 
No. 115209/10, 2015 WL 7070066, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 
7, 2015) (explaining that the contract’s termination provision 
“made it clear . . . that only complete performance will satisfy 
the agreement”) (emphasis added).   
 
The distinction between a covenant and termination 
provision is meaningful.  When parties say that breach of a 
provision would result in termination or rescission of the 
contract, they make clear that the provision is material.  
Williston on Contracts § 63:3 (stating that a breach is material 
if “the parties considered the breach as vital to the existence of 
the contract”) (emphasis added).  By contrast, covenants 
address the parties’ obligations (i.e., what they must and must 
not do) and typically are not a natural place to look when 
 
Gordon (“Gordon”) with respect to the Picture). 
“Cash Breakeven” shall mean the point at which 
“Contingent Proceeds” are first achieved, but 
calculated utilizing the applicable distribution 
fees referred to above. Company makes no 
representation that the Picture will generate any 
Contingent Compensation, or any particular 
amount of Contingent Compensation. 
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determining which of those obligations the parties consider to 
be material.   
 
Further, the requirement that Cohen not be in breach or 
default may be better viewed as a condition precedent to 
TWC’s payment obligation, as evidenced by the word “if” that 
begins the relevant provision.  See Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Glob. 
Reinsurance Corp. of Am., 693 F.3d 417, 430 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(describing a condition precedent as an event whose 
occurrence triggers an obligation).  This is relevant, as “[t]here 
is a distinction . . . between failure of a condition and a breach 
of a duty . . . . [I]f the remaining obligations in the contract are 
mere conditions, not duties, then the contract cannot be 
executory for purposes of § 365.”  Columbia Gas, 50 F.3d at 
241.  Here, the analysis is complicated by TWC having an 
independent obligation not to be in breach or default even 
without the condition precedent language.  Still, a condition 
precedent is typically not an obligation itself, nor does it inform 
which obligations are material.  Indeed, Cohen did not point to 
any authority that held language in a condition precedent 
contracted around the substantial performance rule.  On the 
contrary, we are persuaded by the reasoning adopted by one 
court that a condition precedent should not be read so broadly.  
See ShermansTravel Media, LLC v. Gen3Ventures, LLC, 152 
N.E.3d 616, 624 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020).  There, a settlement 
agreement required “complete performance” by the defendant 
for the plaintiff to dismiss a lawsuit.  Id.  The Indiana Court of 
Appeals rejected the “overly literal reading of the term 
‘complete’ which effectively relieved [the plaintiff of the 
responsibility] of showing material breach.”  Id.  Instead, it 
held that the substantial performance rule continued to apply 
where “there is no express provision . . . stating that substantial 
performance does not apply.”  Id. at 626; see also Gen. Disc. 
22 
 
Corp. v. Weiss Mach. Corp., 437 N.E.2d 145, 151 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 1982).  
 
Finally, if we accept Cohen’s argument, then the parties 
also overrode protections in the Bankruptcy Code.  Interstate 
Bakeries, 751 F.3d at 962 (“The doctrine of substantial 
performance . . . is inherent in the Countryman definition of 
executory contract.”).  As explained above, the Code’s 
treatment of contracts facilitates the debtor’s rehabilitation by 
treating non-executory contracts where only the debtor has 
material obligations to perform as liabilities of the estate, so 
the debtor does not accidentally assume them without good 
reason.  Here, the logical implication of Cohen’s position is 
that the Cohen Agreement would be an executory contract 
forever, no matter how much he has already performed.  Oral 
Arg. Tr. 23:22–25.  That would be a highly unusual result and 
would contravene the protections created for the Debtors by 
the Bankruptcy Code.   
 
To be clear, we recognize that parties can contract 
around a state’s default contract rule regarding substantial 
performance, and by doing so they can also override the 
Bankruptcy Code’s intended protections for the debtor.  
However, that result can only be accomplished clearly and 
unambiguously in the text of the agreement.  For the reasons 
explained above, we do not believe the Cohen Agreement 
avoided New York’s substantial performance rule.  As we 
agree with the Bankruptcy and District Courts that Cohen’s 
remaining obligations are immaterial and ancillary to the 
purpose of the contract, we hold that the Cohen Agreement is 




 Cohen raises two additional arguments that the 
Bankruptcy Court erred by granting summary judgment.  We 
are unpersuaded by both.  
 
First, Cohen argues that, even if the Cohen Agreement 
is not executory on its face, the Bankruptcy Court should have 
allowed for additional discovery and factfinding.  While he is 
correct that under New York law “[t]he issue of whether a party 
has substantially performed is usually a question of fact,” a 
court can decide it as a matter of law “where the inferences are 
certain.”  Exide, 607 F.3d at 963 (citation omitted).  Indeed, we 
previously held that the contracts at issue in Exide were not 
executory based on “[o]ur inspection of the record.”  Id.  New 
York courts have also frequently resolved the materiality of 
contractual provisions as a question of law.  See, e.g., Wiljeff, 
LLC v. United Realty Mgmt. Corp., 82 A.D.3d 1616, 1617 
(N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“[W]here the evidence concerning the 
materiality is clear and substantially uncontradicted . . . [,] the 
question is a matter of law for the court to decide.”) (second 
alteration in original) (citation omitted).  In this case, the 
decisions of the Bankruptcy and District Courts were well 
supported by the plain text of the Cohen Agreement, as well as 
uncontradicted evidence that the Picture was made and 
released nearly six years before the Debtors’ bankruptcy filing.  
Cohen’s position is further undercut by the fact he chose not to 
submit an affidavit or present a witness at the hearing in the 
Bankruptcy Court.  Further, he does not explain what evidence 
the Bankruptcy Court should develop if there were a remand.  
In this context, we reject his argument that the Bankruptcy 




Second, Cohen presses the Hail Mary argument that the 
Bankruptcy Court did not have enough evidence to conclude 
that TWC owned the Cohen Agreement and could sell it.  
However, the Bankruptcy Court’s decision is well supported 
by the testimony of Irwin Reiter, who was the Executive Vice 
President for Accounting and Financial Reporting at TWC, and 
later held the same role at Spyglass.  After Reiter testified about 
the chain-of-title for the Cohen Agreement, Cohen’s counsel 
cross-examined him.  The Bankruptcy Court determined that, 
based on “the evidence presented . . . [,] SLPTWC Films did 
dissolve . . . [and] the debtor, who was the sole member of that 
LLC, acquired all of the rights to its property.”  App. 2268–69, 
Bankr. Hr’g Tr. 135:20–25, 136:4–6.  Cohen contends that the 
Bankruptcy Court neglected to draw factual inferences in his 
favor, but the summary judgment standard does not require a 
court to draw improbable inferences.  See Matsushita Elec. 
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986).  
We agree with the Bankruptcy Court that the evidence clearly 
shows SLPTWC dissolved before TWC’s bankruptcy and 
TWC, as its sole member, received all its assets and contract 
rights.10  Further, Reiter testified the chain-of-title satisfied 
banks, as TWC was able to “license the picture . . . [and] 
 
10 Cohen argues that the Bankruptcy Court incorrectly applied 
New York LLC dissolution law when it should have applied 
Delaware law.  However, we do not see how the two laws 
meaningfully differ on the question of whether the sole 
member of an LLC would receive its assets upon dissolution.  
The two statutes have nearly identical distribution schemes.  
Compare 34 N.Y. Ltd. Liab. Co. Law § 704 with 6 Del. Code 
§ 18-804.  And both states also have similar provisions on who 
can wind up an LLC.  Compare 34 N.Y. Ltd. Liab. Co. § 703 
with 6 Del. Code § 18-803.   
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borrow based on the picture.”  App. 2225, Bankr. Hr’g Tr. 
92:4–5.  In any event, Cohen never names who else might own 
the Cohen Agreement if not the Debtors.  Hence we agree with 
the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that TWC owned the 
Cohen Agreement and could sell it.   
  
*    *    *    *    * 
 
Bankruptcy often affects contract counterparties who do 
business with the debtor.  Here, TWC owes money to Cohen 
under a work-made-for-hire production services contract, but 
he has no material obligations left to perform, as he produced 
and released the film several years before TWC’s bankruptcy.  
No provision in the contract clearly and unambiguously 
overrode New York’s default substantial performance rule that 
obligations are immaterial if they do not go to the root and 
purpose of the transaction.  Accordingly, the Bankruptcy Code 
views the Cohen Agreement as a non-executory contract that 
is in essence a liability for the Debtors that can be sold to 
Spyglass under Bankruptcy Code § 363 without the need to 
cure existing defaults.  Hence the approximately $400,000 in 
contingent compensation owed to Cohen before the sale’s 
closing does not need to be paid in full, though (if timely) it 
can still be asserted as an unsecured claim to be paid out in the 
normal course pro rata with other unsecured creditors.  This 
pill is bitter to swallow, but bankruptcy inevitably creates harsh 
results for some players.  We thus affirm the District Court’s 
order affirming the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling.      
